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Abstract  
This submitted article identifies relations between the degree of 
decentralization and economic imbalances on the basis of a cluster (exploratory) 
analysis. Two indicators have been chosen for measuring economic inequalities: an 
indicator of dispersion of regional GDP per capita as representative of the 
performance imbalances within countries (it measures the economic development 
gap among regions in European countries); and a multidimensional inequality-
adjusted human development index as representative of inequalities in the 
distribution of wealth in the countries. Decentralization is measured by means of  
a decentralization index, which contains both quantitative and qualitative 
components. Although groups of countries characterised by a high degree of 
decentralization do not necessarily show the lowest degrees of economic 
imbalances, it is however possible to conclude that the countries in groups with  
a higher degree of decentralization are among those countries with more favourable 
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values of the economic imbalances indicators monitored. As a part of the research, 
two clusters of countries were identified which are identical in their degree of 
decentralization, but differ in the results connected with economic imbalances. The 
differences are caused by different institutional qualities in the two groups. 
 
Keywords: cluster analysis, decentralization, economic development, human 
development, inequality, regional disparities 
1. Introduction  
One of the most important policies of the European Union, in terms of both 
sustainable growth and financial resources, is the cohesion policy. Its main 
objective is to reduce economic and social inequalities between regions (also 
called regional disparities). Territorial cohesion reinforces the basic orientation of 
the EU cohesion policy. It is not interpreted as a „mere” redistributive tool, but is 
defined as a policy of development. Territorial cohesion is about mobilizing 
potential, not about compensating for geographical differences. One of its 
principles is the rule of subsidiarity, which emphasizes decentralization and the 
role of public administration. The result has been a shift from the concept of 
“government” to the concept of “governance” (Laboutková 2009, pp. 14–30). 
Legislation, financial arrangements and trust in local solutions all concentrate on 
municipalities and regions as the most important players. Federalism in Germany, 
strong metropolitan and municipal administrations in France and Great Britain, 
and effective political regionalization in Spain, has stimulated many best-practice 
conventions in countries that seek their own governance models. A question has 
arisen whether it is possible to identify decentralization models which do not 
deepen economic imbalances.  
This article identifies, on the basis of a cluster (exploratory) data analysis, 
relations between the degree of decentralization and economic disparities, which are 
represented by differences in regional GDP and imbalances in the distribution of 
wealth within countries based on the difference between the Human Development 
Index (HDI) and Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI).  
The aim of the research is to define groups of countries and to characterize 
their mutual similarities on the basis of selected indicators and to find out whether  
a higher degree of autonomy of administrative units brings about lower imbalances 
in production and in distribution.  
For the measurement of regional disparities, an indicator of dispersion of the 
regional gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is used. Previous studies focusing 
on the relationship between decentralization and regional disparities have not 
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reached a clear outcome. Most authors have been engaged mainly in fiscal 
decentralization (Prud’homme 1994; Panizza 1999, pp. 97–139; Gil Canaleta et al 
2004, pp. 71–94; Letelier 2005, pp. 155–183; Bodman and Hodge 2010, pp. 373–404; 
Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez 2011, pp. 321–343). The reason for their narrower 
focus is the fact that political decentralization is less suitable for quantification. 
Another weakness of these studies is that most of them are based on national 
rather than regional sources. Regional data are either aggregated collectively from 
individual states, or in some instances are not available at all. Yet if we are to 
examine the relationships between decentralization and regional disparities, it is 
necessary to work with regional data. The main goal of such an investigation is to 
detect regional differences rather than differences between countries.  
In this context, the decision-making competences are more essential than 
executive powers (Laboutková 2012, pp. 277–292). Among the recent works which 
comprehensively investigated the influence of decentralization on regional 
disparities, one should include the work of Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra (Rodríguez-
Pose and Ezcurra 2009; p. 52). They analysed the relationship between fiscal and 
political decentralization and the development of regional disparities in a sample of 
twenty-six countries. The study concluded that this relationship is significantly 
influenced by the overall economic level of the given state. While political 
decentralization in developed countries does not affect the development of regional 
disparities, fiscal decentralization alleviates them. In contrast however, fiscal 
decentralization in the emerging economies deepens inequalities between regions.  
This negative effect cannot be compensated for by the observed positive 
effect of political decentralization. The main cause for this is a weak redistributive 
capacity in these countries in comparison to the developed ones. Such 
a conclusion strengthens the argument that the cohesion policy should not be 
understood as a synonym for redistributive policies. The authors of the present 
article are inclined to accept the modern concept of the cohesion policy and they 
understand decentralization as a set of quantitative and qualitative factors 
(financial decentralization and decentralization of decision-making) which 
complement each other. 
For these reasons, an index of decentralization is utilized in this work, in 
which both the above-mentioned components are included. This is the first 
contribution of this article to the issue. The second benefit of this paper is its 
focus not only on imbalances in economic performance, but also on a qualitative 
point of view through the Human Development Index (HDI), or its modified 
version, the Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI). The concept 
of the human development index highlighted the importance of those factors (in 
addition to gross national income per capita) which are also closely associated 
with the quality of life from the perspective of human resources (educational 
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characteristics and life expectancy). For the purpose of the article the “loss” 
between the HDI and IHDI was selected. Although the IHDI has been developed 
only recently and therefore does not yet provide long-term data, it offers a real 
picture of human development (Sen 1973). 
2. Analytical Description of Key Indicators 
Decentralization can generally be divided into three categories (Sharma 
2009, pp. 47–65): political, fiscal, and administrative. The political concept of 
decentralization means that the devolution of legislative and/or administrative 
functions to a sub-national level which autonomously performs the assigned 
functions through democratically-elected and politically-accountable bodies. 
One of the indicators of political decentralization is the form of election of the 
top representatives of local government, which is further supplemented by 
formal and informal mechanisms of public consultations for planning and 
implementation of public projects. Fiscal decentralization is considered to be the 
core of decentralization. It includes two aspects: the first is the division of 
responsibilities for expenditures and revenue sources among the national, 
regional, and local levels of government; and the second is the extent of the 
regional and local governments’ power in terms of determining their own 
spending and revenues. In order to make decentralized functions effective, 
regional governments must either gain an adequate level of income locally, or 
a transfer from the central government together with the power to decide on 
spending. While local governments are usually responsible for public services on 
the expenditure side, this obligation does not automatically imply their right to 
levy taxes. A purely administrative concept of decentralization means the 
transfer of administrative functions from one administrative level to another.  
In this respect, a unique empirical research can be found in From Subsidiarity 
to Success: The Impact of Decentralization on Economic Growth, which was carried 
out in the spring of 2009 by AER2 in cooperation with BAK Basel Economics.3 It 
examined the link between the degree of autonomy of regions (data has been 
collected from 234 regions in 16 European countries) and the degree of 
decentralization of the state with economic development4 (AER 2009).  
                                                 
2
 The Assembly of European Regions (AER), founded in 1985, is the largest independent network of 
regions in the wider Europe. It comprises 270 regions from 33 countries and 16 interregional organizations. 
3
 BAK BASEL – a private economic institute founded in 1980 and based in Basel, which 
specializes, inter alia, in international comparisons of regions. 
4
 For more details about the sets of data, see AER (2009). 
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For measurements of decentralization, all public powers were compared 
(‘powers’ are here used as a synonym for regulatory power) in countries with 
different levels of governance: from the highest state level to the municipal level. 
Owing to its multidimensionality and complexity, decentralization cannot be 
studied or measured directly. However, many individual aspects in the vertical 
organization of a country can be observed. These observable aspects (altogether 
there were 185 of them) were systematically collected, and the measured 
information was aggregated into an index of decentralization. The Decentralization 
Index (DEX) contains both quantitative and qualitative components. Financial 
decentralization has a weight of 40% and includes mainly quantitative information 
about the amount of income and expenditure in relation to the central government. 
Decentralization in decision-making has a weight of around 60% of the entire 
index. Apart from information on the relative number of officials, the index of 
decentralization contains multiple qualitative information sets regarding the 
structure and distribution of decision-making in public affairs between the various 
levels of government of a state. 
The cause of uneven regional development is the occurrence of spatial 
variability in the socio-economic development, leading to the emergence of spatial 
inequalities. The imbalance of spatial structures in different regions gives rise to 
regional disparity, which manifests itself in a dissimilarity or disproportion of 
phenomena or processes having a unique spatial distribution. In terms of  
a theoretical explanation, it is difficult to define the causes of uneven regional 
development. Factors such as the size of the country (Williamson 1965, pp. 3–45), 
core-periphery models, technological equipment, and infrastructure affect the local 
allocation of private capital, and thus predetermine redistribution processes within 
the economy. Specific factors of regional inequality can be traced in the transition 
countries in connection with the change of the coordination mechanism (Petrakos 
2001, pp. 359–383; Ezcurra and Pascual 2007, pp. 5–32). In the last twenty years, 
the ambiguous impact of the liberalization and globalization of trade has been 
discussed in the context of regional development (Milanovic 2002, pp. 21–43; 
Rodríguez-Pose and Gill 2006, pp. 1201–1222). Models of a “new economic 
geography” emphasize the relationships between uneven spatial development and 
economic growth (Krugman 1998, pp. 7–17; Fujita and Thisse 2002). 
In connection with its assessment of the development in the regions within 
the member states, Eurostat has published an Indicator of Variance (Dispersion, 
D) of the Regional GDP per capita since 2007. For a given country, the 
dispersion ‘D’ of the regional GDP of the level 2 regions is defined as the sum 
of the absolute differences between regional and national GDP per inhabitant, 
weighted on the basis of the regional share of population and expressed in 
percent of the national GDP per inhabitant.  
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The Human Development Index (HDI) has been published since 1990 in 
the periodical Human Development Reports (HDR) within the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP). The annual HDR in November 2010 contained 
a new methodology and a change in some of the index parameters, including: 
• a partial factor approach to education was investigated using the education index,  
• factors in life expectancy and level of health care use the life expectancy index;  
• a new use of the income index (calculated from Gross National Income – 
GNI per capita in PPP USD data) as an indicator of the standard of living.  
Individual sub-index values are calculated using both the maximum and 
minimum reported figures, plus the actual reported figures for each country. For 
example, in 2011 longevity had an interval of 29–83.2 years; the education 
component intervals consisted of: expected total years 0–20.6; average education 
period 0–13.2 years, and a combined index ranging from 0–0951. The interval 
for GNI was 163–108,211 USD per capita in purchasing power parity (UNDP 
United Nations Development Programme 2011). 
The resulting sub-index value ranges from 1 (best outcome) to 0 (worst 
outcome), and there is a geometric mean value of the HDI (the original HDI was 
constructed as an arithmetic mean, i.e. without weights). An accompanying 
indicator of human development is the new multidimensional IHDI, which is 
based on the same principles as the HDI (i.e. life expectancy, education, and 
economic level), but also reflects the unequal distribution of each sub-factor in the 
population (the inequality of access to available resources). It can be concluded 
that IHDI is the real indicator of the level of human development, while HDI can 
be interpreted as an index of human development potential, or the maximum level 
of IHDI which could be achieved in the absence of inequalities in the distribution 
of wealth. The Overall Loss (L) caused by human development inequalities is 
responsible for the difference between IHDI and HDI, and can be expressed as 
a percentage. The average loss in the HDI due to inequality is about 23%  – that is, 
adjusted for inequality, the global HDI of 0.682 in 2011 would fall to 0.525. 
Countries with less human development tend to have greater inequality in more 
dimensions  –  and thus larger losses in human development (UNDP 2011). 
3. Methods 
In the following calculations and statistical data analysis the values of 
decentralization (DEX) calculated in 2009 and economic inequalities (D and L) 
calculated for 2010 and 2011 were used. The construction of an Index of 
Decentralization is unique and complex. It takes both qualitative and quantitative 
data into account. While quantitative data have been collected from official 
international sources, the qualitative data have been collected directly in the 
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regions by means of a questionnaire. The time discrepancy is due to the fact that 
IHDI began to be published in 2010 and the last results for the Indicator of 
Variance were published by Eurostat in 2011. The authors assumed that the 
changes in the values of DEX would be negligible for observed countries in one 
year. The complete data set is available for 22 European countries. For the 
classification of the countries into the individual groups according to their 
common characteristics, the Cluster Analysis Method has been used, the basis of 
which is the classification of statistical sample variables into clusters in such  
a way that the variables belonging to one cluster are very similar from the 
viewpoint of the characteristics monitored, and the variables belonging to 
different clusters are significantly different (Stankovičová and Vojtková 2007, 
Řezanková, Húsek and Snášel 2007). The individual countries were classified 
into clusters on the basis of the standardized squared Euclidian distance: 
( ) ( ) ( )∑
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22 /;,  (1) 
where: ( )iid j ′;  is the distance between the i-th and i´-th variable,  
nii ,...2,1=′≠ , it means ( ) jiijj xxiid ′−=′; , pj ,...,2,1= , and  ( )jxs 2  is a sample variance of the j-th variable. 
This metric requires the variables not to be correlated. For the verification of 
this hypothesis, the t-test about the significance of the correlation coefficient was used. 
The alternative hypothesis was formulated as two-tailed; i.e. the correlation coefficient 
is not equal to zero. The test statistic used is the t-statistic, which is distributed as 
Student´s t distribution with df = n – 2. On the 5 percent level of significance, the null 
hypothesis was not rejected in any tests of the hypothesis about the significance of the 
correlation coefficient. This means that the variables are not correlated. The calculated 
values of correlation coefficients and P-values are given in Table 1 below.  
Table 1. Correlation coefficients matrix for the years 2010 and 2011 
 DEX D L 
Index/rok 2010 2011 2010 2011 2010 2011 
DEX - 
- 
- 
- 
-0.344* 
   0.117** 
-0.353* 
   0.107** 
-0.250* 
   0.261** 
-0.335* 
   0.127** 
D -0.344* 
   0.117** 
-0.353* 
   0.107** 
- 
- 
- 
- 
-0.108* 
   0.632** 
-0.108* 
   0.632** 
L -0.250* 
    0.261** 
-0.335* 
   0.127** 
-0.108* 
   0.632** 
-0.034* 
   0.882** 
- 
- 
- 
- 
* value of sample correlation coefficient, ** calculated P-Value 
Source: Authors' own calculations based on the data from EC (2011, 2012, 2013), AER (2009), UNDP 
(2011, 2012, 2013). 
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The next step was the choice of a clustering algorithm. In this step, one of 
the hierarchical agglomerative clustering algorithms was applied to the data 
monitored  –  the furthest neighbour method; i.e. putting together in one cluster 
those variables where the distance between their most distant elements is 
minimal. The optimum number of clusters was determined by means of the 
heuristic approach. When determining a suitable number of clusters, outlier 
observations were identified, i.e. observations/variables which differed 
significantly from the others. Namely this concerned Croatia, which represents  
a separate cluster at de facto any set number of clusters. Chart 1 below provides 
a better visual representation of the distance of these clusters, as it explicitly 
shows that variables 3 and 4 are outside the field where all other variables are 
located. If outlier observations are detected, they should be excluded from the 
initial matrix because they could cause an undesirable distortion of results. The 
fact that both the variables/observations are outlier observations was further 
verified by means of the calculation of Mahalanobis distance, which is part of 
the test statistic F from the test of outlier observations. Only Croatia was verified 
to be an outlier observation. 
Chart 1. 2D Cluster Scatterplot for 2010 and 2011  
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Source: authors' own data gained by means of the programme STATGRAPHICS Centurion XVI. 
Once Croatia was excluded from the group of the countries observed, an 
optimum number of six clusters for the year 2010 and five clusters for the year 
2011 were established. The result of the procedure of clusters’ creation is 
graphically illustrated by means of a dendrogram in Chart 2 below. 
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Chart 2. Dendrogram for 21 countries, the furthest neighbor method, the standardized squared 
Euclidian distance – 2010 and 2010 
 
Source: authors' own data gained by means of the programme STATGRAPHICS Centurion XVI. 
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4. Results and discussion 
Are countries with a higher degree of decentralisation economically more 
equal than centrally-governed countries? 
For both periods of observation, the observed European countries were 
classified into the resulting clusters on the basis of their similarity, according to the 
indicators of the degree of decentralization (DEX) and economic imbalances (D, L). 
For 2010, six clusters of countries were used: countries with the smallest economic 
imbalances on average, mainly regarding uneven regional development (Cluster 1); 
a group of counties with the combination of high uneven regional development and 
low values of inequalities in the distribution of wealth on average (Cluster 4); 
countries with the average highest level of decentralization (Cluster 2); and on the 
other hand – countries most centralized on average (Cluster 3); and countries with 
the highest inequalities in the distribution of wealth on average (Cluster 6)  –  see 
Table 2. Cluster 5 is rather difficult to define as it is not distinguished by any strong 
characteristics; it includes countries which are rather centrally governed and where 
the average value of the indicators of economic imbalances is around the average of 
all the observed countries. In the cluster analysis for 2011 this group disintegrated: 
Ireland became part of Cluster 1; Greece was put into Cluster 3; and France into 
Cluster 6. In 2011 Romania also changed its Cluster (from Cluster 6 to Cluster 3), as 
well as the UK (from Cluster 4 to Cluster 5). Mainly in 2011, as parts of their 
groups, France, Ireland and the UK are not as compatible with the other countries 
from the viewpoint of the indicators observed. For example the UK is highly 
specific in terms of decentralization, which can be the cause of its “fluctuation” 
between the selected clusters. While England, where almost 90% of the UK 
inhabitants live, is governed by the central institutions of the United Kingdom, the 
remaining three countries (Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland) have various 
levels of autonomy. In 2011 Ireland significantly improved in terms of the 
imbalance in the distribution of wealth (by 2 percentage points), which transferred it 
to the cluster characterised by a low average of economic imbalances. For France, 
the year-to-year values of the indicators observed almost did not change, but the 
disintegration of the former group put it together with the countries with slightly 
above-average values of observed economic imbalances. Further analysis will 
therefore mainly focus on those countries which did not change their groups in the 
periods observed (16 countries), including Greece and Romania because these 
counties, together with Bulgaria, formed a relatively compact group for 2011.  
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Table 2. Distribution of countries into clusters according to the similarity of indicators 
Group Characteristics Country 
 2010 2011 
1 
Average decentralized countries with the least uneven regional 
development 
AT AT 
NL NL 
DK DK 
SE SE 
FI FI 
 
IE 
2 
Highly decentralized countries 
ES ES 
DE DE 
BE BE 
3 
Centrally-governed countries with the highest economic 
inequalities 
BG 
BG 
EL 
RO 
4 
Countries with high uneven regional development 
and low inequalities in distribution of wealth 
CZ CZ 
SK SK 
NOR NOR 
HU HU 
UK  
5 
Rather centrally-governed countries 
FR  
IE  
EL  
6 
Average decentralized countries with rather higher economic 
inequalities 
IT IT 
PL PL 
PT PT 
RO FR 
 UK 
 HR HR 
Source: authors' own data gained on the basis of the results STATGRAPHICS Centurion XVI. 
Countries with the lowest average value of decentralization in both the 
periods observed showed the worst results on average, both in the uneven 
regional development indicator as well as in the indicator measuring the 
inequalities in the distribution of wealth (DEX32010 = 25; D32010 = 40.3; L32010 = 
11.3; DEX32011 = 33; D32011 = 32.9; L32011 = 12.06). The countries placed into the 
second cluster  – Austria, Belgium, Germany and Spain (and in 2011 also 
Ireland) with the average highest level of decentralization (DEX2 = 62.33 for 
both the periods observed) showed an average value of the index of dispersion 
D22010 = 19.7; D22011 = 19.56 and the average loss in distribution L22010 = 8.7; 
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L22011 = 7.8, which are valued slightly below the average. It can therefore be 
stated that the countries with the highest degree of decentralization perform 
better on average than centralized countries. 
Table 3. Centroids in 2009, 2010, 2011 
Cluster DEX D L 
 2009 2009 2010 2011 2010 2011 
1   47.6    46.5 16.16 16.0167    7.3 6.51667 
2 62.3333 62.3333      19.7 19.5667    8.7    7.8 
3   25.0    33.0      40.3 32.9333  11.3  12.0667 
4   44.0    42.75      30.34    30.625    7.54    5.825 
5   38.0 -      22.4 - 9.53333 - 
6  46.25    46.6  24.725    23.88  11.7    9.66 
Average for 21 
countries  44.773    44.773      20.46    20.336    8.93    8.048 
Note: ‘Centroid’ can be defined as the average value of each variable over all members of the cluster. 
Source: Authors' own calculation in the programme STATGRAPHICS Centurion XVI on the basis 
of data from EC (2011, 2012, 2013), AER (2009), UNDP (2011; 2012; 2013). 
The interpretation of Clusters 1 and 6 is quite challenging. The countries 
in the first cluster (Austria, Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Ireland 
in 2011) and the countries in the sixth cluster (Italy, Poland, Portugal, in 2010 
Romania and France and the UK in 2011) are characterised by very similar 
average values of decentralization (DEX12010 = 47.6; DEX62010 = 46.25; DEX12011 
= 46.5; DEX62011 = 46.6;), which are slightly above the average for the European 
countries observed. They differ however in the values of economic imbalances 
shown. While Group 1 achieves lower values of imbalances on average – in  
D and L the average values in 2010 are even the lowest out of all the groups 
(D12010 = 16.6; L12010 = 7.3), the values observed for Group 5 on the other hand 
are higher on average than the average for the whole set, and the average loss in 
distribution for 2010 is the highest of all (L52010 = 11.7). Thus the first question 
to ask is: Why are countries where economic imbalances are among the lowest 
(Cluster 1) only slightly above average decentralized countries? This group 
consists of countries which are labelled as socially democratic economies or 
welfare states; see (Amable 2003) and his models of capitalism, or (Esping-
Andersen 1990) and his three worlds of welfare capitalism. To reduce inequality, 
governments conduct transfers and redistributive policies in favour of 
disadvantaged regions or weaker social groups. If such equalization systems are 
too strong, they might weaken the spirit of decentralisation (AER 2009).  
A second question which needs to be answered is: How it is possible that 
the countries with similar levels of decentralization showed very different results 
in terms of economic imbalances? This question is partially answered by 
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previous research, which showed that decentralization is not among the strong 
factors influencing economic imbalances (Bednářová and Laboutková 2014,  
pp. 1052–1064). Thanks to cluster analysis, it is however possible to provide a 
more robust explanation. The degree of decentralization is one thing, and the 
quality of governance another. Huther and Shah (2005) explicitly linked 
governance to the notion of institutions, defining it as “all aspects of the exercise 
of authority through formal and informal institutions in the management of the 
resource endowment of a state” (Huther and Shah 2005). To explain the 
discrepancy mentioned, certain sub-indicators of the most popular and widely used 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGIs) (WB 2010) were selected. WGIs (in 
terms of the earlier concept of Governance Matters) follow up the process by 
which governments are selected, monitored and replaced, the capacity of the 
government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies, and the respect 
of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social 
interactions among them. The concept was originated and has been monitored 
long-term by the World Bank, which structures quality governance into six sub-
indicators: democracy, political stability, government performance, regulatory 
quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. Aggregated indicators are 
normalized and are in the range from –2.5 (worst) to +2.5 (best result). For the 
purpose of this article, the following sub-indicators were selected for comparison:  
Government effectiveness – this captures perceptions of the quality of public 
services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from 
political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the 
credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. 
Regulatory quality – this captures perceptions of the ability of the government to 
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote 
private sector development. 
Control of corruption – this captures perceptions of the extent to which public 
power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as the "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. 
Values for the sub-indexes selected (Table 4 below) clearly show that the 
countries in Cluster 1 perform significantly better in terms of the quality of 
governance than the countries belonging to Cluster 5. 
 
 
 
 
40                      Šárka Laboutková, Pavla Bednářová, Vladimíra Hovorková Valentová                    
Table 4. The capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies 
 
 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Regulatory 
Quality 
Control of 
Corruption 
1 
Countries with the least 
economic inequalities 
AT 1.84 1.47 1.6 
NL 1.73 1.74 2.2 
DK 2.09 1.88 2.4 
SE 2.01 2.01 2.3 
FI 2.25 1.67 2.2 
average 1.98 1.75 2.14 
5 
Countries with the highest 
inequalities in the distribution 
of wealth 
IT 0.45 0.89 0.0 
PL 0.64 0.99 0.4 
PT 1.02 0.72 1.0 
RO         –0.25 0.64         –0.2 
average 
 
0.46 
 
0.81 
 
0.3 
Source: authors' own calculation on the basis of WB (2010). 
The fourth cluster includes the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Norway 
and the UK (the UK only for 2010). This cluster is also characterised by a rather 
average decentralization, but high inter-regional differences in economic 
performance within the individual countries. In 2010, the highest level of regional 
average GDP per inhabitant was at least three times as high as the lowest level in 
the United Kingdom and Slovakia, whereas it was more than twice as high in the 
Czech Republic and Hungary and nearly double in Norway. As in many of the EU 
Member States, the capital city region (at the NUTS level 2) of these countries had 
the highest GDP per inhabitant (in PPS). For example, the average level of GDP 
per inhabitant in Inner London was 2.2 times higher than in Berkshire, 
Buckinghamshire and Oxfordshire (the region with the second highest level of 
GDP per inhabitant in the United Kingdom). Such differences between capital 
regions and the region with the second highest level of GDP per inhabitant were 
even greater (in relative terms) in Slovakia and the Czech Republic, as the 
Bratislava region had an average that was 2.6 times higher than in Zapadne 
Slovensko, while in Prague it was 2.3 times higher than in Jihovychod. In the 
Czech Republic, the capital city region of Prague (home to 11.9% of the Czech 
population) had an average GDP per inhabitant (in PPS) that was 72% higher 
than the EU-27 average in 2010, while the seven remaining NUTS level 2 
regions in the Czech Republic (home to the remaining 88.1% of the population) 
each reported an average GDP per inhabitant that was below 75% of the EU-27 
average. The same pattern was observed in neighbouring Slovakia, where the 
GDP per inhabitant in the capital city region of Bratislava (with 11.5% of the 
population) was 77% higher than the EU-27 average, while the remaining three 
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NUTS level 2 regions (with 88.5% of the population) each recorded GDP per 
inhabitant that was below 75% of the EU-27 average. Among the level 3 regions 
in Norway, the capital city region of Oslo recorded a GDP per inhabitant 
equivalent to 248% of the EU-27 average, while none of the other Norwegian 
regions saw their average GDP per inhabitant fall below the EU-27 average – 
GDP per inhabitant was above the EU-27 average, ranging from 102% of the 
EU-27 average in Hedmark og Oppland to 192% in Oslo og Akershus. There 
were two other Norwegian regions with GDP per inhabitant more than 25% 
above the EU-27 average (Agder og Rogaland and Vestlandet). (EC 2013)  
Another characteristic feature for this group is that while the countries 
have a relatively high average of uneven regional development, they are among 
the countries with low or average L (with the exception of the UK). In 2011 this 
group was even the lowest on average out of all the groups monitored (probably 
due to the UK's removal from the group). This phenomenon could be explained 
by the fact that the group includes three post-communist countries, which for 
decades were rather homogeneous in terms of the distribution of the resources 
created due to the egalitarian salary policy of the former political nomenclature, 
which itself did not belong to this equalization. Moreover, education, health care 
and other public services were free of charge for everybody (paid from taxes) 
and of the same quality (again with the exception of the political elite). 
Following the collapse of the centrally-governed economy and during the 
transformation period, no larger social or economic imbalances originated 
among the inhabitants of the respective countries, which was also due to the 
habits in the approach to remuneration, to the funding of public services, and to 
the phenomenon of wealth in general. A World Bank study (WB 2000) found 
that although income disparities between the rich and the poor increased in 
virtually all transition economies during the 1990s, the extent of the increase 
varied considerably across countries. For example, among Central European 
transition countries, the increase in inequality was considerably lower than that 
observed in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). According to the 
Life in Transition Survey data (EBRD 2007), the citizens of the EU8 countries5 
have a high aversion to income inequality. According to Zaidi, government tax 
and transfer policies were found to have a powerful impact on the distribution of 
disposable incomes: for example taxes and transfers dampened the increases in 
income inequality due to the increased dispersion of earnings in Central European 
countries to a considerably greater extent than in the CIS (Zaidi 2009).  
In analyzing variations across countries in terms of peoples ’preferences for 
redistributive state spending’, many studies have found that respondents in post-
socialist countries profess a greater support for such spending than their U.S. or 
                                                 
5
 Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. 
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Western counterparts. However, these preferences are not necessarily confined to 
post-socialist countries alone; e.g. Norway also exhibits similar public preferences 
for high redistributive state spending (Murthi and Tiongson 2008). Norway is 
among those countries which redistribute income based on the principle of 
equality and it thus belongs among socially democratic countries. This assertion 
can be supported by means of the Gini index. The Gini coefficient is based on the 
equivalised disposable income of each individual (Falco 2014). Norway, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary are under the European average. 
5. Conclusions 
This article has focused on the argument that the degree of decentralization 
affects the level of economic inequalities. The aim of the research was therefore to 
select groups of countries and to characterize their mutual similarity on the basis 
of selected indicators, and to find out whether a higher degree of autonomy of 
administrative units brings about lower imbalances in production and in 
distribution. The theoretical basis for the research performed was represented by 
three main economic functions of a modern government in a mixed economy: 
firstly a state provides conditions for good functioning of market mechanisms, for 
achieving an efficient allocation of resources, or else it itself allocates resources 
for the provision of public property; secondly, the fair functioning of market 
mechanisms results in income redistribution in the interest of higher income and 
property equality; and thirdly, it ensures internal and external stability of the 
economy by means of a macroeconomic stabilization policy (Sojka and Konečný 
1996). The economic perspective highlights mainly the criterion of efficiency – 
which might be divided into consumer efficiency, producer efficiency, and 
efficiency through competition – as the key argument in favour of decentralization 
(AER 2009). From the viewpoint of the macroeconomic environment and its 
stability, policies coming from the centre seemed to be more effective, as the 
regional units below the central government do not have the appropriate tools for 
an effective economic stabilisation policy (AER 2009). If, for example, an 
expansive fiscal policy at the sub-national level is conducted, a big part of the 
action will be lost through spillovers to other regional units due to their actions as 
free riders. Kotsogiannis demonstrated that decentralised regimes are associated 
with lower foreign direct investments for institutional reasons; therefore more 
centralised countries signal more stability and thus attract more foreign direct 
investments (Kotsogiannis 2005). Another example is price stability, that can be 
obtained only by monetary authorities, which are at least on the national level. 
                                                   Economic Inequalities And Level Of…                                        43 
Hence a completely decentralised country is not able to protect and promote 
macroeconomic stability appropriately (Prud’homme 1994).  
Based on the cluster analysis performed, the selected countries were divided 
into three groups which have certain strong unifying characteristics. For the 
calculations and statistical analysis, values of decentralization (DEX) and economic 
inequalities (D and L) were used. From the results obtained, it cannot be definitively 
stated that countries characterised by a high degree of decentralization necessarily 
show the lowest degrees of economic imbalances. Nevertheless it is possible to 
conclude that the countries with a higher degree of decentralization belong among 
countries with more favourable values of the economic imbalances indicators 
monitored. An optimal degree of decentralisation should achieve a slightly above-
average value, because both too high and mainly too low levels of decentralisation 
cause welfare losses (Clusters 2 and 3). Also other factors, such as the overall 
economic level of the countries observed and the quality of institutions, play  
a certain role, as was proved by, e.g. Clusters 1 and 6, and the phenomenon of path 
dependency (Cluster 4). Future research should focus on the analysis of the 
clusters identified above from the viewpoint of market failures and the search for 
the way to deliver public goods efficiently and equitably (according to the fiscal 
federalism and new public management perspectives in models of government), 
and also from the viewpoint of establishing an institutional framework which 
primarily deals with governmental failures (according to the public choice and 
the new institutional economics perspectives). 
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Streszczenie 
 
DYSPROPORCJE EKONOMICZNE I SKALA DECENTRALIZACJI  
W KRAJACH EUROPEJSKICH – ANALIZA SKUPIEŃ 
 
W przedstawionym artykule na podstawie analizy skupień danych (metody 
eksploracyjnej) zidentyfikowano zależności pomiędzy decentralizacją a dysproporcjami  
w rozwoju ekonomicznym. Do pomiaru dysproporcji ekonomicznych wybrano dwa 
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wskaźniki: wskaźnik regionalnego rozproszenia PKB na mieszkańca, pokazujący 
dysproporcje w rozwoju gospodarczym (pomiar przepaści ekonomicznej w rozwoju pomiędzy 
regionami krajów europejskich) oraz wielowymiarowy wskaźnik nierównomiernego rozwoju 
społecznego, pokazujący dysproporcje jakości życia w badanych krajach. Decentralizację 
zbadano za pośrednictwem wskaźnika decentralizacji, obejmującego zarówno elementy 
jakościowe, jak i ilościowe. Chociaż grupy państw charakteryzujących się wysokim 
stopniem decentralizacji nie wykazują w każdym przypadku najniższego stopnia 
dysproporcji ekonomicznych, można sformułować wniosek, że kraje zrzeszone w grupach  
o wyższym stopniu decentralizacji należą do państw o korzystniejszych wartościach 
badanych wskaźników dysproporcji ekonomicznych. W ramach badań zidentyfikowano 
dwa skupienia krajów, które są identyczne z punktu widzenia stopnia decentralizacji, ale 
różnią się pod względem dysproporcji ekonomicznych. Przyczynę stanowi odmienna jakość 
instytucjonalna w obu grupach. 
 
Słowa kluczowe: analiza klastrowa, decentralizacja, rozwój gospodarczy, rozwój 
społeczny, nierówność, dysproporcje regionalne 
 
